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Montclair State University
Few studies have examined differences in the guilty plea decisions of youth and adults. In interviews with
64 youth (X ⫽ 15.9, SD ⫽ 1.2) and 56 adults (X ⫽ 38.5, SD ⫽ 11.5) who pleaded guilty to felonies in
New York City, we found important differences between the youths and adults in their understanding of
the plea process, the factors they considered when making decisions, and their rationales for their
decisions. Youth were less likely to recognize that a guilty plea resulted in a criminal record and to
understand the trial process, and they reported having considered fewer potential outcomes in their
decision making than adults. Like adults, youth overwhelmingly reported pleading guilty for reduced
charges or penalties, but were substantially less likely than adults to understand the nature of the rights
they were waiving. Our findings raise the question of whether the assumption of competence for youth
is reasonable, and whether steps to assess youth understanding and decisional competence should be
taken before youth are allowed to enter into plea agreements.

Public Significance Statement
Youth convicted by guilty plea in criminal court had poorer knowledge of trial rights and considered
fewer consequences when making plea decisions than adults. These findings cast doubt on the
presumption of competence for youth in the plea negotiation process.

Keywords: guilty pleas, adolescents, decision making, legal understanding
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000314.supp

Plea bargaining is an indispensable part of the United States’
criminal justice system (Brown & Bunnell, 2006). More than 90%
of all criminal cases in the United States are resolved by some
form of plea deal (Devers, 2011), and despite the range of criticisms that have been levied against the practice (Dervan, 2012;
Lynch, 1994; Wright, 2005), the plea bargain is likely to remain
the primary way that justice is dispensed in the United States for
the foreseeable future (Brown & Bunnell, 2006). Recognizing this
reality, there has been a recent renewal of interest among psychology and law scholars in understanding the psychology of plea deal

decision making and in identifying factors that may undermine the
legitimacy of the process for some defendants (Redlich, Bibas,
Edkins, & Madon, 2017). This research has begun to reveal several
person-centric (e.g., group outcome disparities; Daftary-Kapur &
Zottoli, 2014; Edkins, 2011; Kutateladze, Andiloro, Johnson, &
Spohn, 2014) and system-centric variables (e.g., plea discounts;
Bushway, Redlich, & Norris, 2014; Edkins & Dervan, 2018;
Zottoli, Daftary-Kapur, Winters, & Hogan, 2016) that may contribute to problematic outcomes for at least some defendants. In
this article we focus specifically on disparities in the understanding
and decision making of adults and youth who plead guilty in
criminal court.
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Adolescent Legal Capacities
A significant body of research makes clear that adolescents, as
a group, are at increased risk for rights violations during the
adjudicative process (Redlich, Silverman, & Steiner, 2003; Scott &
Grisso, 2004; Viljoen & Wingrove, 2007). Adolescents often lack
a complete understanding of legal concepts (Redlich et al., 2003),
may be psychosocially immature (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000),
and may be more likely to rely on short-term, positive, and social
consequences when making decisions (Albert, Chein, & Steinberg,
2013). Research on the legal capacities of adolescents has found
that youth are more likely than adults to show deficits in the
capacities necessary to participate competently at trial (Grisso et
166
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al., 2003; Redlich et al., 2003; Viljoen, Odgers, Grisso, &
Tillbrook, 2007), they often struggle to understand and appreciate
the significance of their Miranda rights and are more likely than
adults to waive their rights during police questioning (Abramovitch, Peterson-Badali, & Rohan, 1995; Grisso, 1981; Viljoen &
Roesch, 2005) and give false confessions (Drizin & Leo, 2004).
While fewer studies have examined youth decision making
specifically in the context of plea offers (for review see Redlich,
Zottoli, & Daftary-Kapur, in press), this growing body of research
has already investigated several important questions, including
how youth make decisions about pleas, the extent to which youth
understand the plea process and appreciate the outcomes that
follow their decisions (Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2014; Redlich &
Shteynberg, 2016; Viljoen, Klaver, & Roesch, 2005), and how
youth and adults differ in terms of their experiences of the process
(Zottoli et al., 2016). In research using hypothetical scenarios, both
justice-involved and nonjustice-involved youth have been shown
to be more likely to accept plea offers, both in general (Grisso et
al., 2003) and when innocent (Helm, Reyna, Franz, & Novick,
2018; Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016), to score significantly lower
than adults on measures of legal knowledge, both general and plea
specific (Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016), and to be less likely to
recognize the long-term consequences of their decisions (Grisso et
al., 2003). In a recent field study of youth convicted by guilty plea
in criminal court, we found youth to possess relatively limited
understanding of plea deals in general and a limited appreciation
for the consequences that attached to their own guilty pleas
(Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2014). Also, the youth in our sample
appeared to be overly influenced by the short-term, positive consequences of plea offers, such as going home right away (DaftaryKapur & Zottoli, 2014). Finally, two recent studies on youth in
New York City (Zottoli et al., 2016) and California (Malloy,
Shulman, & Cauffman, 2014) found rates of self-reported false
guilty pleas to be 27% and 17%, respectively.
Taken together, the research on adolescent legal capacities,
including the research on guilty pleas, suggests that adolescents
who are offered plea deals in criminal court may be at increased
risk for rights violations relative to adults and may be at increased
risk to plead guilty when innocent. However, the body of knowledge in this area is deficient in at least two ways that limit the
extent to which we can rely on it for policy recommendations.
First, few studies have compared adolescent and adult decision
making directly, and of those that have, only two have done so
with justice-involved samples (Grisso et al., 2003; Zottoli et al.,
2016). The first of these studies is limited by its use of hypothetical
vignettes and the extent to which data on delinquent youth can be
extrapolated to the population of youth charged in criminal court
(Grisso et al., 2003) and the other did not address decision making
per se, but rather the context of decisions, such as attorney contact
and decision-time frames (Zottoli et al., 2016). Second, there have
been no qualitative explorations of how adults and youth approach
plea decisions. While quantitative data are essential to inferring
population differences, qualitative methods help focus attention on
the meanings and perceptions of participants and enable us to
consider the social context of their experiences—information that
is often lost when quantitative data are aggregated and reduced to
summary statistics (e.g., Griffin, 2004). Here we address these
gaps with a mixed—method study of youth and adults who were
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offered plea deals in the Supreme Court (i.e., criminal court) of
New York.

Study Aims
Through this investigation, we sought to learn how youth and
adults differ in terms of their understanding of the plea process
(both in general and with respect to their own cases), the number
and kinds of factors they consider when making their decisions,
their rationales for their plea decisions and their self-reported
innocence or guilt. Specifically, we intended to provide estimates
for population differences on several legal understanding and
decision-making variables and to thematically organize and describe participants’ responses to questions about their own decision making and their beliefs about the process. We anticipated
that from within our broad areas of inquiry, there might emerge
differences between youth and adults that have implications for the
presumption of competency of youth who plead guilty and/or of
the knowingness and willingness of their decisions.

Method
Participants
We interviewed 69 adolescents and 60 adults who had been
mandated to community-based, alternative-to-incarceration (ATI)
programs in New York City (NYC). The majority (98%) of juveniles accused of crimes in NYC (whether the case originates in
family or criminal court) pass through ATI programs at some
point, either while their cases are pending or after sentencing
(Gewirtz, 2014). While the percentage of adults that pass through
ATIs is unknown, like youth, adults may be mandated to ATIs
during the pendencies of their cases or as a condition of probation
or parole. The study was open to all English speaking individuals
under the supervision of the facilities from which we recruited,
provided that they were charged with felonies in criminal court.
One youth and four adults were excluded because their cases
involved misdemeanor charges and an additional four youth were
excluded because their cases were adjudicated in family court. In
New York State, whether a youth younger than 18 years of
age—16 at the time these data were collected—will be adjudicated
in family or criminal court is a statutory determination made on the
basis of filed charges (N.Y. CPL NYS LAW § 1.20, nd). The final
sample comprised 64 youth and 56 adults whose cases involved at
least one felony charge in criminal court. All adults and the
majority of youth had already accepted offers and were either
awaiting sentencing or had been sentenced. Two youth had rejected offers and were awaiting trial; one youth was planning to
plead guilty at his next court date. Fifty-seven percent of the adults
and all but one youth were interviewed within 2 years of their plea
decisions. Seven adults pleaded five or more years before interview; the remaining adults and one youth pleaded between 3 and
5 years prior. See Table 1 for other sample characteristics.

Measures
Demographic information. We gathered information on age,
sex, race/ethnicity, education level, special education history, men-
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Table 1
Sample Characteristics
Participant variable
a
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Age at arrest
Age at interview
Race
Black
White
Hispanic
Male
Hx mental disorderb
Hx special education
Prior arrestsc
Penalty reductiond

Adults

Youth

33.4 (11.0)
38.5 (11.5)

15.0 (.84)
15.9 (1.2)

75.0%
8.9%
17.9%
91.1%
54%
23.2%
Mode ⫽ 0, 21%
Range: 0 to 37
.76 (.26)

80.0%
11.7%
31.1%
76.2%
21%
12.5%
Mode ⫽ 0, 50%
Range: 0 to 20
.93 (.22)

a

Adults were between 18 and 62 years old at the time of arrest and between
19 and 63 at the time interview. The majority of youth were between 14
and 16 years of age at time of arrest (two were 13-years-old and two were
17) and between 14 and 19 at the time of interview (one was 13-yearsold). b Mental disorder included any self-reported past or current diagnosis, including substance abuse. c Among youth with prior arrests, 60%
reported one juvenile court finding (mode ⫽ 1, 46.7%) and 63.5% reported
at least one criminal court conviction (mode ⫽ 1, 23%). All adults with
prior arrests reported at least one criminal conviction, with modal prior
convictions of 1 and 2 (35.7% of adults respectively). d Reflects custodial
sentence reduction relative to maximum custodial sentence associated with
original charges. Distributions for both groups are heavily skewed. The
majority of youth (88%) received probation in lieu of a custodial sentence.

tal health history, and prior juvenile and criminal justice involvement for all participants. All data were self-reported.
Interview protocol. Our interview protocol (online supplemental material), which was an expanded and extended version of
that used in a previous study (Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2014),
covered legal understanding (including assessment of general
knowledge about guilty pleas as well as knowledge specific to
participants’ own cases) and decision making, and included a
question about actual guilt/innocence. With slight variation by
topic, the interview proceeded from general open-ended questions
(e.g., what did you think about when you were deciding whether or
not you would accept your plea offer?), through specific openended questions (e.g., Did you think about the good things that
would happen if you accepted your plea offer? What were those
things?), and finally to closed-ended (i.e., Yes/No) questions (e.g.,
Did you worry about having a criminal record?). Where appropriate, responses to open-ended questions were followed by some
variation of the prompt “Was there anything else?” and when
responses were vague or not understood, nonleading queries such
as (but not limited to) “Can you tell me more about that?’ or “Can
you explain what you mean by (participant response)?” were
made. The structure of some questions was adapted from the
Judgment in Legal Contexts interview (JILC; Grisso et al., 2003).
In developing criteria for correct or incorrect responses to legal
understanding items, we relied on standard legal definitions (Lehman & Phelps, 2004) and law in the jurisdiction, as well as on
guidelines provided in generally accepted Forensic Assessment
Instrument manuals for the assessment of legal competency (e.g.,
The Fitness Interview Test, revised; Roesch, Zapf, & Eaves, 2006).
Legal understanding. Questions in this section assessed
knowledge of the plea and trial process (general and case-specific),
including the rights forfeited when one pleads guilty and the

general consequences of entering a guilty plea. Specifically, we
asked questions about whether guilty pleas entail admissions of
guilt, result in criminal records, and are final. We also asked
participants whether one has a choice in pleading guilty, and, if so,
what the alternative options are. Anticipating that the response “I
had no choice” could as well reflect subjective interpretations of
the situation as it could legal knowledge, we included follow-up
questions to help us differentiate between participants who knew
they had a legal choice (i.e., could have a trial) and those who did
not (i.e., those who believed that the only legal option was accepting a plea offer). Similarly, based on our prior work (DaftaryKapur & Zottoli, 2014) we anticipated that at least some participants who acknowledged trial rights would nonetheless have an
inaccurate understanding of the function of a trial and/or of what
a trial entails (e.g., in our previous study some participants thought
their pretrial appearance was a trial). Therefore, we incorporated
systematic follow-up questions (e.g., What happens at trial; What
do you think would have happened if you went to trial) that helped
us differentiate between those who accurately understood the function of a trial and the trial process from those who did not.
Decision-making. In the decision-making section of the interview, we first asked participants to freely recall the factors they
considered in making their plea decisions, and then we asked
specifically about the pros and cons they considered for each
option (i.e., accepting and rejecting the offer). After these openended items, we asked participants whether they considered each
of a set of specific factors/consequences, in the form of yes/no
items. Participants were also asked about their primary reason(s)
for their plea decisions. Finally, presuming that plea decisions
depend to some degree on beliefs about trial outcomes, participants
who acknowledged trial as an option (regardless of accuracy),
were asked a series of questions about their expectations for the
outcomes of their trials as well as the certainty of and the reasons
for those beliefs.
False-guilty pleas. Lastly, we provided participants with three
generic scenarios of defendants facing plea decisions and asked
them to choose the scenario that most closely described their cases.
In the first scenario the defendant was guilty as charged; in the
second, he was charged with something more serious than what he
did and pleaded to something closer to the actual offense, and in
the last one, the defendant was innocent.

Procedure
All procedures were approved by the Institutional Review
Boards of Montclair State University and Fairleigh Dickinson
University and met the American Psychological Association’s
guidelines for ethical research (American Psychological Association, 2002). Permission was granted by the participating ATIs to
recruit and collect data at their sites. We recruited participants
during mandatory group sessions at the ATI facilities. To ensure
that we reached a representative cross-section of the population,
we recruited on all week-days and during both morning and
afternoon sessions. Typically, 30 – 40% of group attenders volunteered, though the rate varied between zero and 100%. Volunteers
signed up and were then contacted privately to schedule an interview. Adult participants signed consent forms at the time of their
interviews. Youth provided contact information for their parents or
guardians (cross-checked with ATI staff) and the co-authors ob-
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tained verbal consent from parents or guardians before scheduling
interviews. Youth gave verbal assent at the time of interview and
were provided with an informational sheet on the study. Interviews
lasted between 30 minutes and 1 hour and were conducted by the
co-authors or trained research assistants in private rooms at the
ATI facilities. For compensation, adults received $40 in cash and
youth received a $40 gift card.
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Analytic Strategy
Qualitative analyses. We transcribed interviews and, apart
from objectively scored content (i.e., yes/no questions; counts), subjected the text to content analysis. We used NVivo (Castleberry,
2014) to facilitate content coding. Coding varied according to domain
of inquiry. For most of the legal understanding portion of the interview, codes were relatively simple and established, a priori, based
upon legal definitions and existing guidelines for assessing legal
knowledge in competency exams. We used both deductive and inductive methods to develop coding categories for the decision making
portion of the interview. We established deductive codes a priori,
based on prior research on adolescent decision making (e.g., coding
responses for short- vs. long-term orientation). In keeping with definitions used in our prior study (Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2014), we
incorporated two central ideas into our definitions for future orientation: the time-frame in which a consequence would be initially experienced, as well as the extent to which the consequence would have
lasting impact. Thus, we defined long-term consequences as those that
would not be realized before a year’s time or that would have lasting
negative or positive impact. For example, “having a criminal record”
would be coded long-term, because even though one might receive
that record soon, its impact is lasting. For this study, we subdivided
short-term consequences into immediate and short-term to account for
the increased salience of consequences that are realized with very little
delay. We defined as immediate those consequences that would be
realized within hours and up to a day (e.g., “I can go home today”),
and as short-term those that would be felt after one day but before a
year (e.g., “I keep having to go to court dates”). Of course, these
cut-offs are somewhat subjective; our data will be made available to
investigators who wish to utilize different schemes.
For codes developed inductively, we developed initial lists of
categories and a general coding framework based on emergent
themes, following the steps outlined by Haney, Russell, Gulek, and
Fierros (1998). We reviewed initial categories and established final
coding categories using the constant-comparative method which
entails the systematic comparison of each new text to be assigned
to a category with each of those texts that has already been
assigned to the category (Glaser, 1965). Four student research
assistants (who were not involved in data collection) coded response data in close consultation with the coauthors. Kappas,
based on codes for 15 randomly selected interviews, ranged from
.67 to .79 (substantial agreement; Viera & Garrett, 2005) and
disagreements were resolved by consensus. Inferential analyses
were conducted on data for which meaningful population inferences could be made (e.g., proportion of correct responses).
Quantitative analyses. In an effort to estimate population parameters that are generally understood and practically meaningful, all
items that yielded quantitative data were either scored as correct/
incorrect responses (e.g., Does pleading guilty require an admission of
wrong-doing?) or were formatted in such a way as to yield counts
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(e.g., number of participants who considered a particular consequence). In keeping with the growing trend to move away from null
hypothesis significance testing (NHST; Cumming, 2013; Gigerenzer,
2004; Kruschke, 2010), we used Bayesian estimation for all quantitative analyses. Bayesian methods are independent of the intentions of
the investigator (i.e., they do not depend on sample size or stopping
rules) and they allow for probabilistic estimations of the population
parameters of interest; that is, unlike frequentist confidence intervals
that either do or do not include the population parameter, Bayesian
posterior distributions are probability density functions of the parameter itself (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018; Wagenmakers, 2007). For
readers who may prefer frequentist analyses, Table 2 provides a
NHST for each Bayesian parameter estimate reported.
As this is the first study, to our knowledge, that directly compared
adults and youth from these populations, we utilized low-information
(i.e., vague) priors that assumed equivalence between groups. Following Kruschke (2015), for analyses of proportion differences, we
modeled our prior estimates with beta distributions and utilized Bernoulli or binomial distributions to model our data likelihood functions,
and for count data we modeled our prior estimates with normal
distributions and utilized exponential Poisson distributions to model
the likelihood functions. For continuous data, we modeled priors with
normal distributions and used t-distributions for the likelihood functions. We report 95% Highest Density Intervals (HDIs) for all estimates. The 95% HDI is the portion of the posterior distribution for the
population parameter that includes the 95% most probable values for
the parameter; because the posterior distribution is a density function,
we can also provide probabilities for various ranges of possible
values, conditional on the data observed. For proportions, we report
the probability that differences between groups exceed .1 (or 10%);
for count data (e.g., outcomes endorsed) we report probability that
differences exceed one.
We ran all analyses in R (R Core Team, 2013) using packages coda
(Plummer, Best, Cowles, & Vines, 2006) and rjags (Plummer, 2016),
and utilized scripts provided by Kruschke (2015), which were modified for the specifications of our study. All posterior distributions
were generated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling, run in
JAGS (Plummer, 2017), and, consistent with recommended practices
(Gelman & Rubin, 1992), we utilized three chains per analysis to
establish representativeness and stability of the posterior distribution.
Again, following Kruschke (2015), we initialized chains at random
points near the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) from the likelihood function of the data derived by resampling. We verified stability
and representativeness of chains by inspection of various convergence
criteria in common usage (Cowles & Carlin, 1996), including autocorrelation (near zero), shrinkage (Gelman-Rubin factor ⬍1.1), and
parameter density plots that are closely superimposed. We ran all
NHSTs in SPSS (IBM Corp, 2015).

Results
Participant Variables
Table 1 provides sample characteristics. Youth and adults differed on self-reported histories of psychological disorder (PD) and
special education (SE), and in time-since-plea. Controlling for age,
none of these variables were associated with knowledge or
decision-making outcomes, and when controlling for PD, SE and

ZOTTOLI AND DAFTARY-KAPUR

170

Table 2
Results of Null-Hypothesis Significant Tests for Each Bayesian Parameter Estimation Reported in Text
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Response variable
Legal understanding
Admit guilt (general)
Admit guilt (self)
Record (general)
Record (self)
Change mind (general)b
Choice (general)
Acknowledged trial right (general)
Choice (self)
Acknowledged trial right (self)
Accurate trial knowledge
Decision making
Factors considered (open)c
Factors considered (cued)c
Long-term consequences
False guilty pleasd
Innocent
Partially innocent
Guilty

Adults

Youth

97%
98%
94%
82%
46%
100%
89%
66%
94%
94%

84%
84%
71%
48%
13%
94%
78%
87%
85%
67%


X
 ⫽ 1.7
X ⫽ 4.3
65%
19.6%
46.4%
34%


X
 ⫽ 1.3
X ⫽ 2.7
57%
34.6%
22%
42%

Test resulta
2(115,
2(111,
2(104,
2(107,
2(111,
2(119,
2(120,
2(112,
2(114,
2(117,

Legal Understanding
All estimates are based upon valid percentages (i.e., excluding
missing data). When missing or refused responses make valid
percentages difficult to interpret in context, we provide the size of
valid respondent sample in text.
Admission of guilt. Eighty-four percent of youth and 97% of
adults recognized that guilty pleas entail admissions of guilt, 95%
HDI: 4 –24%; p( ⬎ 10% | y) ⫽ .751; likewise, 84% of youth and
98% of adults acknowledged that they admitted wrong-doing,
themselves, when they pleaded guilty, 95% HDI: 4 –24%, p( ⬎
10% | y) ⫽ .76.
Criminal record. Only 71% of youth compared with 94% of
adults recognized that a guilty plea results in a criminal record,
95% HDI: 9⫺36%, p( ⬎ 10% | y) ⫽ .97, and even fewer youth
(48%) compared with adults (82%) said that their own guilty pleas
resulted in criminal records, 95% HDI: 17– 48%, p( ⬎ 10% | y)
⬃1.
Finality of guilty plea. Youth (13%) were less likely than
adults (46%) to say that defendants can change their minds after
telling the judge that they accepted a plea offer, 95% HDI: 17–
48%, p( ⬎ 10% | y) ⬃1.
Choice and trial knowledge. Apart from four youth, all participants recognized that a person offered a plea deal has a choice,
95% HDI: ⫺2 to 13%, p( ⬎ 10% | y) ⫽ .12. However, fewer
participants (78% of youth and 89% of adults) indicated that a
defendant could choose to go to trial if he or she rejected a plea
offer, even after being directly probed with the question “If a
defendant refuses a plea offer, can he have a trial?” 95% HDI: ⫺2
to 23%, p( ⬎ 10% | y) ⫽ .52.
When asked whether they, themselves, had a choice in accepting
their own plea offers, youth (90%; n ⫽ 54, 60 responded) were

⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽

.19
8.8
12.6
16.3
16.6
1.4
2.6
5.2
2.5
14.9

Wald 2(114, 2) ⫽ 3.3
Wald 2(107, 2) ⫽ 168
t(90) ⫽ 1.2

b

Effect size











.67
.003
.002
⬍.001
⬍.001
.23
.10
.002
.12
⬍.001
.07
⬍.001
.23

2(115, 1) ⫽ 7.0
2(115, 1) ⫽ 4.6
2(115, 1) ⫽ .6

Note. CI ⫽ confidence interval.
a
Sample sizes vary result-to-result because of missing or refused responses.
els. d Omnibus 2(115, 2) ⫽ 8.2, p ⫽ .017.

time-since-plea, the existing relationships between age and outcome variables remained robust.

2)
2)
2)
2)
2)
2)
1)
1)
1)
1)

p-value

⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽
⫽

.04
.28
.34
.39
.39
.11
.15
.22
.15
.36

95% CI
[⫺.14, .22]
[.04, .01]
[.16, .50]
[.23, .54]
[.22, .54]
[⫺.07, .28]
[⫺.03, .32]
[.04, .40]
[⫺.03, .34]
[.19, .51]

Exp(B) ⫽ 1.3
Exp(B) ⫽ 1.6
d ⫽ .27

[.98, 1.8]
[1.3, 1.9]
[⫺.17, .67]

 ⫽ .24
 ⫽ .20
 ⫽ .07

[.06, .40]
[.02, .37]
[⫺.11, .25]

.007
.032
.44

Question about own-case not asked.

c

Poisson regression mod-

more likely than adults (73%; n ⫽ 38, 52 responded) to answer
yes; 95% HDI: 6 –36%, p( ⬎ 10% | y) ⫽ .92. However, as
anticipated, 85% of the youth (61 responded) and 94% of the
adults (53 responded) acknowledged on subsequent questioning
that they knew they could have a trial if they wanted one, 95%
HDI: ⫺3 to 20%, p( ⬎ 10% | y) ⫽ .38; suggesting that the
question about having a choice, at least for the adults, tapped
perception of realistic options, not knowledge of legal options.
Finally, youth (67%; 64 responded) were less likely than adults
(94%; 53 responded) to have at least a rudimentary understanding
of what a trial actually is (i.e., that the prosecutor must prove his
case and the defendant has the right to present and challenge
evidence, etc.), 95% HDI: 12–38%, p( ⬎ 10% | y) ⫽ .99. To
illustrate, the following responses to the question “What happens
at trial?” come from youth who stated that they knew they had a
choice and that they could go to trial:
14 y/o, female: “I’m a little fuzzy on that one.”
14 y/o, male: “[You get] a sentence. [You] go to the judge and
the judge decides what he wants to do.”

Plea Decision Making
Factors considered. On average, youth and adults gave a
similar number of total responses when asked the general and open
ended question “What were you thinking about when
 you were
deciding whether
or
not
to
accept
your
plea
offer?”
X
youth ⫽ 1.3,

Mdyouth ⫽ 1; Xadult ⫽ 1.7, Mdadults ⫽ 1; 95% HDI: ⫺.7 to ⫺.1,
1
This notation can be interpreted as follows: The 95% HDI for the
difference in proportion (we report it as a percentage) of youth and adults
who know that pleading guilty entails an admission of guilt is 4 to 24%.
Conditional on the data observed, the probability is .75 that the difference
is greater than 10%. HDI stands for Highest Density Interval.
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p( ⬎ 1 | y) ⬃ 0. More pronounced differences between groups
appeared when participants were cued (i.e., “Did you think about
the good/bad things that would happen if you accepted/rejected the
plea offer? What were those things?). Adults gave approximately
twice
as many responses as youth, Xadult ⫽ 4, Mdadults ⫽ 4;

Xyouth ⫽ 2.7, Mdyouth ⫽ 2, 95% HDI: .8 to 1.9, p( ⬎ 1 | y) ⫽ .87,
reflecting a 67% increase in responses among adults and only a
19% increase for youth.
Our data provided no evidence for differences between youth
and adults in terms of percentage of responses that reflected
negative or positive outcomes (mode for both groups was 50%) or
that were associated with accepting or rejecting the plea offer, with
both groups providing more responses associated with accepting
plea offers (⬃60% for both groups). In terms of future orientation,
57% of the factors considered by youth and 65% of those considered
 by adults reflected long-term consequences, Xyouth ⫽ 57%,
Xadult ⫽ 65%, 95% HDI: 20 to ⫺4%, p( ⬎ 10% | y) ⫽ .37. Modes
for the immediate and short-term categories for both groups were
zero; statistical models were unstable, so we report only descriptive results here. On average, 26% of the responses of youth
reflected immediate consequences and 18% reflected short-term
consequences; for adults, these percentages were 14 and 22%,
respectively.
Nature of the factors considered. To provide richer contextual detail about what the participants said they were thinking
about when making their decisions, we categorized responses to
the open-ended questions according to emerging themes. Thematic
coding resulted in 14 categories that captured the majority of the
responses (each category comprised at least 15 responses) and two
smaller categories that captured five responses each. If a participant responded to multiple questions with the same response, the
response was coded only once. There were 18 responses that did
not fall into any of these descriptive categories and did not cluster
together in any meaningful ways, reflecting the great diversity
among participants in terms of what they were thinking about at
the times of their decisions. Table 3 provides example responses
reflecting the categories and percentage of participants whose
responses fell in the category.
As expected, the majority of participants (⬎75%) mentioned
thinking about the penalties (plea or trial) that they faced. Roughly
equivalent numbers of youth and adults mentioned thinking about
what option would result in the fastest resolution of their cases and
about “freedom” or being or getting free. Youth were more likely
than adults to say they thought about getting a second chance and
whether or not they would succeed on probation. Adults were
somewhat more likely than youth to say that they considered the
trial process (including likelihood for acquittal), having a criminal
record and how much time they had spent or would spend in
pretrial detention; adults were considerably more likely than youth
to cite concerns about future employment, other social and financial impacts, family concerns, and fears or concerns about prison
life.
Endorsement of specific consequences. We asked participants a series of yes/no questions about whether or not they
considered several common consequences attached to their potential decisions. Table 4 provides percentages of positive endorsements by group, 95% HDI for group differences and the probability that group differences are greater than ⫾10%. On average,
youth and adults endorsed similar numbers of items (youth, 4.7/11,
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adults, 5.3/11), 95% HDI: ⫺.02 to .17, p( ⬎ 1 | y) ⫽ .28. Differences did appear, however, at the item level. The clearest differences in endorsements between youth and adults show up for
concerns about having a criminal record, access to future government entitlements (e.g., housing), and being on probation. Adults
endorsed all of these items more commonly than youth. Youth
were somewhat more likely than adults to endorse concerns about
succeeding on probation. Finally, the items that were most often
endorsed by both groups were ending the legal process and impact
on job opportunities.
Trial outcome expectations. The majority of participants
(67% of youth and 72.5% of adults) believed they would lose if
they went to trial. Fourteen percent of youth and 8.5% of adults
said that they did not know what would happen. Youth and adults
were about equally likely to say they were certain of their expectations for the outcomes of their cases (53% of youth and 55% of
the adults). In contrast to these similarities, clear differences
emerged between the 48 youth (76%) and 36 adults (64%) who
provided reasons to support their expectations. Coding resulted in
five high-level categories for belief rationales: strength of evidence
in the case; general pessimism about the system or system unfairness; reliance on actual guilt or innocence; influence of prior
record; and attorney-related issues. Seven responses were distinct
from each other and distinct from all other categories and were,
therefore, coded as miscellaneous. In Table 5 we provide example
responses and percentage of participants who gave responses that
fell in the category. Youth were more likely than adults to rely on
actual guilt or innocence to support their beliefs about trial outcome and were more likely to reference the evidence in their cases.
On the other hand, adults were more likely than youth to cite prior
record (or lack thereof) to support their expectations, to refer to
general system unfairness or pessimism about the system and to
reference attorney-related reasons.
Primary reason(s) for plea decision. All participants were
asked an open-ended question designed to elicit the primary rationale for their plea decision. Our coding resulted in nine high-level
categories for rationales. Five statements made by participants
were distinct from each other and distinct from all other categories
and were, therefore, coded as miscellaneous. Three participants
gave no response or responded “I don’t know.” Table 6 provides
example responses reflecting the categories and the percentage of
participants whose responses fell in the category. By far, the most
common rationale for pleading guilty was to obtain reduced
charges or sentence, with 40% percent of the youth and 52% of the
adults giving this reason. This rationale was followed by ending or
avoiding pretrial detention and believing that trial was too risky.
Ending the legal process was a fairly common reason given by
youth but not by adults. The remaining categories had many fewer
responses overall, though group trends are apparent for some of
them (e.g., advised to do so).
Given the data we obtained on differences in youth and adult
understanding of their options (specifically, with respect to understanding what trial entails), we conducted a post hoc, holistic
review of the interviews of participants who said they pleaded
guilty to obtain reduced charges or sentence. Three separate
themes emerged: (a) realistic assessment of evidence or trial odds,
(b) expectations of system or trial unfairness, and (c) poor understanding of process (e.g., misunderstanding of what could happen
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Table 3
Factors Considered During Decision Making: Categories, Percentage of Participants With Responses in Each Category, and
Example Responses
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Category

% Adults

% Youth

Examples

Penalty

75%

76%

Trial success

36%

22%

Pretrial detention

27%

17%

Prison life

32%

13%

Freedom

40%

40%

Family concerns

59%

20%

Employment

23%

8%

Other financial or
social impacts

25%

n⫽1

Fastest resolution

25%

22%

Probation

14%

30%

Record

34%

20%

“I looked at [the] outcomes. [. . .] Looked at sentencing guidelines and see what you can get.
Brings things into focus.” (A)
“The consequences were less than if I went to trial.” (A)
“How much lighter the sentence would be; 90 days instead of a year.” (A)
“I thought I was going to be sentenced for a mad long time.” (Y)
“I would go to Riker’s for 1 year.” (Y)
“Just [thinking about] the 15 years- I couldn’t even do a month.” (Y)
“A 20% chance I could beat it.” (A)
“Blowing trial and being convicted.” (A)
“My lawyer struck fear in me. He said the DA has a strong case. I listened to him because he’s
an expert.” (A)
“If I pleaded not guilty I definitely would’ve lost the case.” (Y)
“It’d be good to be found not guilty but that wasn’t gonna happen.” (Y)
“I was stuck in jail.” (A)
“I had already been at Riker’s island for 27 months.” (A)
“I had already spent 1 year in jail.” (A)
“Whether I would be remanded with or without the plea.” (Y)
“Didn’t want to stay in jail no more.” (Y)
“Prison is violent, and I wanted to avoid misunderstandings. Your life is seriously in danger
there, and there are some people that never come home. Guys get jealous of people who take
pleas so you gotta keep to yourself.” (A)
“Being affiliated with different types of gangs, I am not the type to fight. I could have been a
little bitch, not built for jail life.” (A)
“You gotta wait until they tell you can eat, piss, and [expletive].”(A)
“Not being able to eat real food.” (Y)
“In jail you got to rumble and fight every day and night.” (Y)
“My freedom.” (A)
“Anything to get back into the community.” (A)
“Getting back to society.” (A)
“Umm I would’ve missed my summer.” (Y)
“Yea I actually thought about being free.” (Y)
“My mom was dying and my father wasn’t well too.” (A)
“I was thinking of me not seeing my son who was a toddler at the time.” (A)
“I don’t want to come home when my daughters are 21.” (A)
“Kids and my family. My wife does good by herself and knows how to support them.” (A)
“The position I put my parents in.” (Y)
“Not being able to see my family.” (Y)
“Having a robbery charge on job applications, and just overcoming the job situation.” (A)
“[Getting] the job that I wish.” (A)
“If I have to get another job, they’d do a background check.” (A)
“Possibility of getting a job because I have no record.” (Y)
“I was thinking about my lost apartment, losing my luxuries; my motorcycle/car. I lost a lot of
respect from certain people too.” (A)
“Thought about my wife having financial struggles, and with the kids . . . I don’t want my
children on the street.” (A)
“Being accused of being a rat. Individuals looked at me funny. Had to watch my back a lot.”
“Whether or not I wanted to pay money.” (Y)
“Hurry up and get out of judge’s face.” (A)
“I just wanted to get it out of the way.” (A)
“That it would be over. I knew that I was gonna have to do something for the crime, so I just
wanted to get it over with.” (A)
“I wanted to get the case closed ASAP.” (Y)
“Just wanted to get out of the process [and] the system. It was faster.” (Y)
“I was thinking if I could make it on probation.” (A)
“Me not making it through [probation]. Not making it. Some people don’t make it.” (A)
“Thinking about the probation officer looking over me, so I counted the years; 16 to 22, that’s a
long time.” (Y)
“Thinking about am I gonna mess up or am I going to follow through with this program.” (Y)
“I [didn’t] know what to do. I’m only 15 I [didn’t] want to be on probation till I’m 20. Would
rather do the jail time. But, then my lawyer said I would get probation after jail [anyway] so I
don’t understand it.” (Y)
“I asked myself ‘Do I want this on my criminal record or do I want to fight this?’” (A)
“My record would not be as bad.” (A)
“[That] this could be knocked down to misdemeanor.” (A)
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Table 3 (continued)
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Category

% Adults

% Youth

Second chance

20%

29%

Honesty

n⫽2

n⫽3

Collateral legal
consequences

n⫽4

n⫽0

Note.

Examples
“That my record won’t be clean.” (Y)
“I don’t know if my charge would get worse.” (Y)
“I won’t have a record after programming.” (Y)
“Jail could save my life. I could better myself in jail with vocational training and schooling.” (A)
“I thought about that I’d get my mind together and make some changes.” (A)
“Learn some responsibility. By staying on probation I will have to do good. Stay out of trouble,
stop smoking and stuff.” (Y)
“Take the plea to have second change to make things right.” (Y)
“It was the right thing to do, I was guilty either way.” (A)
“Admitting to something that didn’t happen the way I saw it happen. And not being able to tell
my story.” (A)
“Being honest. Looking honest in court.” (Y)
“They could dismiss the federal case and I could lose federal protection, and I’d be open to max
sentences in Kings and Richmond county.” (A)
“Would not have to go to [mandated treatment program] or have the order of protection.” (A)

(A) Indicates that response came from interview of an adult, (Y) indicates youth.

if a plea is rejected). The following are example statements from
protocols categorized as reflecting these themes:
Evidence/odds, youth. “[I would have] got beat.” “There’s
evidence, you know, it’s waiting already there.”
Evidence/odds, adult. “I was scared because I wanted to get
out, and I didn’t want to go to trial. I was guilty and she had
evidence, her face was messed up and there were witnesses.”
System unfair, youth. “A person has a choice but I think it’s
rough if you don’t take it. They are choosing between their
freedom and being treated like a slave. Honestly, I wish I had
better knowledge of laws and the criminal justice system.
Legal aids tell you whatever they want. I would have made a
better decision. I just wish I knew more. It’s all so unfair.”
System unfair, adult. “[I] had to take it because the judge
indirectly told me I would get the maximum time [if I didn’t].
The lawyer made me uncomfortable and told me I should take
it.” “I felt the court system would not be fair to my case.” “I
felt I was getting railroaded.”

Ending legal process
Losing at trial
Being on probationb
Succeeding on probation
Criminal recordb
Job opportunities
School aid
Government programsb
Votingb
Reputation

Adults Youth
86.3%
69.5%
57%
49%
71%
76%
22%
45%
29%
41%

95% HDI
for a

89.2% ⫺14.6 to 9%
52%
⫺1.5 to 34%
78%
⫺36 to ⫺4%
63%
⫺31 to 3%
53%
2 to 33%
68%
⫺7 to 24%
31%
⫺24 to 7%
16%
14 to 45%
16%
⫺1.7 to 28%
25%
⫺1 to 32%

p( ⬎10% | y)
2%
74.5%
89.9%
65.8%
80%
40.2%
1.4%
99%
65.7%
73%

 represents the parameter estimate (i.e., mean difference in percentage of
youth and adults endorsing item). b Indicates the group difference was
significant (p ⬍ .05) under an NHST 2 test for independence.
a

Poor understanding, adult. “[You] take it or come back to
the next court date and then get jail time.”
In our adult sample, the majority of participants who said they
pleaded guilty for reduced time or charges appear to have done so
because they believed that there was strong evidence against them
(67%). Twenty-five percent believed that the system was unfair
and they would fare worse if they proceeded otherwise, and the
remaining 8% seem not to have understood the trial process well
enough to recognize that they could, potentially, be acquitted. In
our youth sample, we saw a different pattern. Forty-seven percent
of the youth who gave the rationale of lesser time or charges
actually failed to understand the legal process, including misunderstanding their rights and the aims of trial. Thirty-two percent of
interviews reflected a rational assessment of the evidence in the
case and 21% reflected a belief that the system was unfair.

False Guilty Pleas

Table 4
Parameter Estimates for Differences in Endorsement of
Specific Consequences
Consequence

Poor understanding, youth. “[You are choosing between] a
plea deal or not, I guess choosing between going to jail.” “[If
you don’t accept the deal] I guess the judge would do what he
gotta go, he decides what happens to you.” “I had to take it.
Judge said come to CCA or jail.”

Finally, when presented with the plea offer scenarios, 42% of
the youth and 34% percent of the adults stated that their cases most
closely resembled the guilty as charged scenario; 22% of youth
and 46.4% of adults selected the scenario wherein the defendant
was guilty of what he pleaded to, but not to what was originally
charged; and 34.6% of youth and 19.6% of adults chose the
innocence scenario. Estimates of interaction-term deflection parameters provide evidence that these variables are not independent,
␤guiltyXinnocent ⫽ ⫺.31, 95% HDI: ⫺1.22 to .54; ␤guiltyXpartial_guilt ⫽
.86, 95% HDI: ⫺.04 to 1.7; ␤innocentXpartial_guilt ⫽ 1.14, 95% HDI:
.08 –2.1. Youth and adults were similarly likely to report being guilty
as charged, ␤guilty ⫽ ⫺.31, 95% HDI: ⫺.68 –.29, whereas adults
were more likely than youth to report being guilty of that to which
they pleaded guilty but not to that with which they were charged,
␤partial_guilt ⫽ .71, 95% HDI: .09 –1.2 and youth were more likely
to report being innocent of all charges, ␤innocent ⫽ ⫺.4, 95%
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Table 5
Reasons for Trial Outcome Expectations: Categories, Percentage of Participants With Responses in Each Category, and
Example Responses
% Youthb

Category

% Adults

Strength of evidence in
case

39%

48%

General pessimism
about system

19%

12.5%

Actual guilt or
innocence

8%

27%

Influence of prior
record

17%

n⫽1

Lawyer-related factorsa

14%

8%

Examples
“They had a lot of evidence against me. The victim was going to be a witness.” (Y)
“Because there’s video against me.” (Y)
“There was no doubt that I was there at the time of the incident, and the victim was
able to describe me down to what I was wearing that day.” (A)
“The evidence was sketchy. Might not hold.” (A)
“[Being] Black in court, usually don’t look too good.” (Y)
“‘Cause that’s the way it works. It’s the system, ya know.” (Y)
“Look at me, I am a black, troubled kid.” (A)
“It’s a money game. They make more money with me living in jail.” (A)
“If I go to trial I will be found guilty cause I am.” (Y)
“I was guilty. I am on another case for robbery; that one I will win because I am
innocent.” (A)
“Umm. Because I didn’t do it.” (Y)
“[When] people at Riker’s saw my file, [they could tell] I was innocent.” (A)
“They would weigh my background and history too.” (Y)
“With my rap sheet, they’d give me the max on everything.” (A)
“It was my first felony so I would have gotten an appeal.” (A)
“Because of my record. I had attempted murder, back in ’89.” (A)
“My lawyer told me [what would happen] and he knows more than me so I like to
listen to him.” (Y)
“My lawyer’s an [expletive].” (Y)
“Because my lawyer wasn’t working well with me [. . .] wasn’t really helping me.” (A)
“I’m pretty sure if I had the right person representing me, it wouldn’t have been
[certain that I would lose].” (A)

Note. (A) Indicates that response came from interview of an adult, (Y) indicates youth.
a
Response reflected belief that lawyer will be ineffective or that belief about case outcome was strongly influenced by lawyer’s opinion.
who said they rejected their offers responded to this question.

HDI: ⫺1.0 to .06. Although the 95% HDI includes zero as a
nonnegligible probability, readers should note that 95% HDIs are
nonsymmetrical; the probability that ␤innocent is less than zero
exceeds 96%. Of the two youth who rejected their offers, one
claimed innocence and the other did not respond.

Discussion
Using a mixed-method approach, we explored three policyrelevant domains: understanding of the plea process (both general
and case specific), factors that influenced plea decision making,
and self-reported factual innocence. We had two aims: quantify
any differences in understanding and decision making between
youth and adults who were convicted by guilty plea and provide
contextual information about these differences that might ultimately help practitioners (attorneys or clinicians) who work with
system-involved youth. Our results are generally in line with
existing research on adolescent legal capacities, which has consistently shown youth to perform more poorly than adults on measures of legal understanding and decisional competency (e.g.,
Cooper, 1997; Grisso, 1981; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). We also
identified some similarities between the youth and adults, not only
in terms of adequate performance but also in deficiencies, suggesting, as others have argued, that comprehension for at least some
aspects of the plea process may be low among defendants, in
general (e.g., Redlich & Summers, 2012). In the following sections
we highlight some of our more compelling results and discuss the
implications that follow from them.

b

Neither youth

Legal Understanding
While the majority of participants understood the basic elements
of a guilty plea, our data revealed two areas of particular concern.
First, fewer youth than adults recognized that a guilty plea results
in a criminal record. This is an important finding, particularly in
New York City (where these interviews were conducted), highlighting the importance of jurisdiction specific research. In New
York, more than two thirds of youth charged as adults receive
youthful offender (YO) status in exchange for their guilty pleas
(Gewirtz, 2014). Specifically, an eligible youth will plead guilty to
the charged (or reduced) felony offense in exchange for a conditionally sealed record and five years of probation, in lieu of
incarceration. Technically, the YO record is not a criminal conviction and the youth need not report it, for example, on a job
application. As such, these offers may confer substantial benefit to
a young person. However, the record is not expunged, and if the
youth violates probation or is arrested again, the YO conviction
will affect the subsequent disposition. The system-level consequences of probation violation or rearrest for youth with YO status
are actually not different from individuals with any prior felony
conviction in NY, including being subject to pretrial detention on
subsequent charges, an issue that the recent Khaleif Browder case
has brought into stark relief (e.g., Gonnerman, 2014).
Almost all the youth in our study who accepted YO deals told us
that they would not have a record after completing probation. We
did not ask systematic follow-up questions to ascertain the extent
to which these youths fully understood the ramifications of their
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Table 6
Decision Rationales: Categories, Percentage of Participants With Responses in Each Category, and Example Responses
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Categorya

% Adults

% Youthb

Examplesc

Reduction in
charges or
sentence

52%

40%

Trial too risky

21%

16%

End or avoid
pretrial
detention

32%

14%

5%

16%

Emotional or
psychological
stress

13%

n⫽1

Family concerns

11%

3%

Advised to do so

n⫽1

8%

Actual guilt

n⫽2

6%

Get a second
chance

n⫽1

n⫽2

“I wanted to take the least severe penalty for the actual thing I was arrested on.” (A)
“It was a lighter sentence and the consequences are basically the same. It is less time to get back on the
road.”(A)
“I didn’t want to go upstate and do the 2 to 6.” (A)
“I wanted my freedom and not to get locked up.” (Y)
“Because I didn’t want to be in prison.” (Y)
“It’s a simple choice of math.” (Y)
“I felt the court system would not be fair to my case, the lawyer was not going to represent me [well at
trial].” (A)
“I felt I couldn’t win if I took it to trial because of the nature of my criminal history and the individual
I was accused of being linked with.” (A)
“It wasn’t worth the risk.” (Y)
“Because I uh knew I was never gonna beat the case, they had me on camera; they had evidence.” (Y)
“I was under extreme stress, incarcerated almost 2 years for this case. Scared, all kind of things,
fighting in jail, not feeding you proper.”(A)
“I was scared. I wanted to get out. Tired of going back to Riker’s. [They] treat you like animals there.”
(A)
“I wanted to go home.” (Y)
“‘Cause I did not want to get remanded.” (Y)
“I was tired of going to court. You will go a million times a year if you let them.” (A)
“It would be better for me, I don’t have to worry about going back to court.” (Y)
“To get it over and done with” (Y)
“‘Cause I was tired of going to court and missing school” (Y)
“Because I was desperate. I wanted out. The DA gave me the offer and I took it. I didn’t have many
options.” (A)
“Because of the fact of me going through this stress.” (A)
“Financial insecurities and knowing collateral damage, psychologically, financially and socially could
[get] worse.” (A)
“‘Cause I was hungry and I did not want to go back to jail. They made me throw away a huge donut I
had at the court.” (Y)
“I wanted to get back home to my kids. [. . .] If I didn’t have kids I might have risked trial. Long time
[waiting] in jail if you don’t take it” (A)
“I wanted to see my son and stepchildren. I lived in foster care. My son is [in foster care now] now,
but kinship maternal aunt. My concern was my kid going through foster care.” (A)
“At the time, my daughter was sick, so I needed to get home as soon as possible.” (A)
“‘Cause of my sister. I talked to her when I was in jail and I got upset. I didn’t want her to see me
going away.” (Y)
“I was instructed by my lawyer.” (A)
“‘Cause when I was talking to the lawyer I admitted it so she said we could go to trial but you
admitted it so you should just plead. ‘Cause she said then I could be home, better than being locked
up.” (Y)
“Because my lawyer said it was a good idea.” (Y)
“My mom made the decision [for me]. I wasn’t part of the process at all.” (Y)
“I knew that I was guilty and the plea gave me the opportunity to come home as early as possible.” (A)
“Because I did the crime. I would take whatever they give me.” (Y)
“Because I thought I was guilty (Q: why did you think you were guilty?) Because of the stuff that I
did.” (Y)
“I had the option to do schooling.” (A)
“To get another chance; to show that I can [. . .] stay out of trouble.” (Y)

End legal process

Note. (A) Indicates that response came from interview of an adult, (Y) indicates youth.
Some participants gave more than one response. Multiple responses reflecting the same rationale (e.g., to get less time; didn’t want to be in prison that
long) were combined and coded once in a single category; multiple statements reflecting more than one rationale (e.g., to get a lower charge and get the
process over with) were coded separately. b Of the two youth who did not accept offers, only one provided a response (worried about failing probation;
coded as Miscellaneous). c Example responses are not necessarily exclusive to the category. For example, the response “I was under extreme stress,
incarcerated almost 2 years for this case. Scared, all kind of things, fighting in jail, not feeding you proper,” was coded under both Emotional or
Psychological Stress and End or Avoid Pre-Trial Detention.
a

YO pleas; however, our impression was that most did not. Future
investigations should explore this question explicitly, especially
given that the most recent statistics available show that 75% of
youth prosecuted as adults in NYC are rearrested post-disposition
(Gewirtz, 2016).
The second area of concern is the rather large discrepancy
between the percentage of youth who said they could go to trial if

they rejected their pleas, and the percentage of youth who did not
grasp what a trial entailed. Specifically, of the 52 youth who
acknowledged having a right to trial, only 14 (27%) fully understood the meaning of that right. In comparison, nearly all of the
adults who acknowledged they could go to trial understood what
that meant. This is a profound difference between youth and adults
and might be an important factor, among others, in explaining the
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higher base rate of self-reported false guilty pleas among youth. At
the very least, this finding implies that the guilty pleas of many
youths may be constitutionally questionable. Attorneys (and
judges at the time of plea colloquy) who rely on superficial
questions such as “Do you understand that you are waiving your
right to a trial?” might be missing important data that will help
establish whether or not a youth is making a knowing and voluntary decision. A recent study reporting interviews with juveniledefense attorneys revealed that attorneys largely believe that their
clients understand the right to trial, but the evidence that attorneys
provide for this belief is that they (the attorneys) have explained it
to the client (Fountain & Woolard, 2018); very few of the attorneys
relied on client-specific indicators of competence. Our data suggest that juvenile clients should be asked to explain what trial is,
what happens at trial, what their roles are in trial and what the
potential outcomes are, before they are assumed to possess this
basic understanding.
Along these lines, it is not unreasonable to assume that some
deficits in youth understanding may be attributable to limited
attorney contact. Youth in this population report meeting infrequently with attorneys and often in conjunction with their scheduled court appearances (Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, 2014; Zottoli et
al., 2016). In these less-than-ideal circumstances it may be difficult
for attorneys to communicate complex legal information to their
juvenile clients in effective ways, and attorneys may come away
with a misperception that information has been assimilated and
appreciated by their clients (Fountain & Woolard, 2018). Future
research should focus on how attorneys relay information and
assess understanding, with a goal of developing best practices that
take into consideration the constraints attorneys face.

Decision Making
Several reasonable conclusions about age-group differences in
guilty-plea decision making can be drawn from our data. Congruent with existing research on adolescent decision making (Grisso
et al., 2003; Mann, Harmoni, & Power, 1989), the youth, relative
to the adults, considered fewer potential outcomes in their decision
making, were less likely to contemplate negative consequences for
aspects of their lives that they have yet had to experience (e.g.,
family and financial concerns; employment) and more likely to
mention certain immediate benefits of pleading guilty, such as
ending the legal process. Adults provided about twice as many
responses as youth, on average, when asked “Did you think about
the good/bad things that would happen if you accepted/rejected
your plea offer? What were those things?”). Grisso et al. (2003)
reported similar results across hypothetical scenarios involving
guilty pleas, police interrogation, and consultation with attorneys.
Some youth may be less capable than adults of generating the full
range of potential outcomes that might attach to decision options,
suggesting that it may be necessary for attorneys or judges to help
youth conceive of and evaluate the possible consequences attached
to the options they face.
Beyond the numbers of factors considered, qualitative analyses
of the responses also reveal differences with respect to what our
participants considered and their ultimate rationales for their decisions. Of course, these differences may not be solely attributable
to development, but may also reflect system and case-specific
differences. For example, youth were more likely to endorse

concerns about being on probation and less likely to be concerned
about having a record and living in prison; adults were more
concerned about family and financial obligations and future employment. On the other hand, that youth were more likely than
adults to say their ultimate reason for pleading guilty was to end
the legal process probably reflects adolescent tendencies to attend
more to the short-term, positive benefits of a decision (Miller &
Byrnes, 2001) and is consistent with prior work (Daftary-Kapur &
Zottoli, 2014; Grisso et al., 2003).
While youth and adults may have emphasized different short or
long-term and positive or negative consequences, overall differences in the proportions of responses between adults and youth
with respect to the future-orientation or positive or negative valence of the consequences they considered were underwhelming.
This was somewhat surprising given well-established developmental differences in future-time orientation and reward seeking (e.g.,
Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996;
Steinberg et al., 2009), as well as evidence for adolescent “shortsightedness” in legal decision making (e.g., Daftary-Kapur &
Zottoli, 2014; Grisso et al., 2003; Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016). In
our first study (that did not have an adult sample and did not cue
participants to talk about pros or cons), the majority of the general
consequences of a guilty plea identified by youth were long-term
and negative, but when asked about their own offers, youth tended
to focus on positive, short-term benefits (Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli,
2014). Here, perhaps as a result of better and more detailed
questioning, both groups reported thinking about a mix of short or
long-term and positive or negative outcomes, with adults reporting
only slightly more long-term consequences than the youth. However, using questions very similar to ours, Grisso et al. (2003)
found adults attended more to long-term consequences than did
youth. Importantly, operational definitions differed between the
studies (a goal of future research might be developing and validating consistent definitions for these terms) and Grisso et al.
(2003) also aggregated responses across three scenarios, likely
resulting in more reliable estimates. These differences, as well as
those between hypothetical and actual decisions, may explain
discrepancies. That said, while the difference between groups with
respect to long-term outcomes was not especially large, a greater
percentage of youth responses, relative to adults, reflected immediate outcomes as opposed to short-term.
Consistent with other studies (e.g., Malloy et al., 2014; Redlich
& Shteynberg, 2016) the most common rationale for pleading
guilty, given by both youth and adults, was to get reduced time or
charges. This response is usually thought to reflect a rational
calculus of competing options; however, we found great diversity
among participants who provided this rationale. Of most relevance
here is that youth were over- represented among those participants
who said they pleaded guilty for reduced charges or penalty, and
who also appeared to have insufficient knowledge about the trial
process and their rights. This finding implies, again, that a more
careful assessment might be required for youth, even when they
provide answers that, on the surface, appear indicative of mature
adult reasoning; similar stated reasons for decisions might not be
based upon the same fund of knowledge.
Finally, while youth and adults were similarly confident in their
expectations of trial outcome, differences emerged with respect to
proffered explanations for these beliefs. Of particular interest to us
is that more than a quarter of the youth (compared with less than
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10% of adults) answered in such a way as to suggest that they
thought their actual guilt or innocence would be self-evident at a
trial. Future research should contemplate the influence of this
illusion of transparency (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998) on
guilty plea decisions and whether youth and adults differ in their
susceptibility to these effects. The reasons youth gave to support
their beliefs about trial outcome should be considered in light of
the fact that many of these youth were unable to accurately
describe what happens in a trial.
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False Guilty Pleas
The majority of participants (56% of youth and 66% of adults)
said that their cases were most similar to the one in our “partial
innocence” scenario (i.e., guilty of plea charges but not guilty of
original charges). Assuming participants were being truthful, there
are a few potential explanations for these data. Among them, are
differences in perception between police or prosecutors who examine available evidence and defendants who have first-hand
knowledge of the offense committed, or differences in what defendants believe they should be charged with and that which the
law prescribes. On the other hand, these data may reflect a tendency on the part of prosecutors to overcharge or stack charges to
facilitate the plea process (e.g., Wright, 2005). More research is
needed to arrive at any definitive conclusions.
Of more relevance to the aims of this study, the rate of selfreported innocence was higher among the youth than the adults.
Empirical data that youth are at increased risk for pleading guilty
when innocent are mounting, with two recent laboratory studies
also reporting higher rates of false guilty pleas among their adolescent participants (e.g., Helm et al., 2018; Redlich & Shteynberg,
2016). Reasons for this phenomenon may be found in the lack of
understanding some youth have for the alternatives to pleading
guilty (as we report here) or in developmental differences in the
cognitive processing styles of youth and adults (e.g., Helm &
Reyna, 2017); for example, Helm et al. (2018) suggest that youth
may rely more on surface level information (e.g., sentencing
differences) rather than on meaning of the information (e.g., implications of felony conviction) or their personal values (e.g., I
would not plead guilty if I were innocent). Additionally, innocent
youth may be more likely than innocent adults to heed the advice
of an attorney who sees a guilty plea as the best option. We found
youth in New York City to have more favorable views of their
attorneys than adults (Zottoli et al., 2016) and Grisso et al. (2003)
found youth to be more compliant with authority across their
hypothetical scenarios.
Jurisdictional differences may also play a role. It is not difficult
to imagine that an offer of immediate freedom and a sealed record
(i.e., the YO deal) would make a guilty plea, even when innocent,
more appealing than a trial that might result in prison and a record
(or that just might take too much time— consider the subsample,
albeit small, of our participants who claimed innocence and believed they could win at trial, but still pleaded guilty). At least two
experimental studies have shown that the likelihood of pleading
guilty (both true and false pleas) increases when the plea sentence
involves probation instead of incarceration (Edkins & Dervan,
2018; Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016). Experimental work comparing the effects of YO-like deals and more traditional deals may

177

help clarify whether these specific conditions increase the likelihood of false-guilty pleas.

Limitations
While the data we present here have important implications for
policy and practice, interpretation of these data are constrained by
several limitations. First, and foremost, our sample size of 120 is
relatively small and participants were self-selected volunteers from
the individuals who passed through these ATIs. We also relied on
self-report, and any attempt to retrospectively access decisionmaking processes is besotted by numerous obstacles, not least of
which are failures of memory and the potential that outcomes
realized since the time of our participants’ decisions may color
recollections of the processes they went through. The latter issue
will likely be exacerbated as time-since-plea increases and, on the
whole, the youth in our study were seen closer in time to their
actual pleas than were many adults. While there was no apparent
impact on response variables, it is still the case that unlike most of
the youth, many of the adults had time to contextualize their plea
decisions and to experience some of the associated collateral
consequences that attached to them. Adults were also more likely
to endorse psychiatric and special education histories, such that
some differences between groups may have been underestimated.
Finally, it goes without saying that our results, although generally
consistent with other field and lab studies, generalize only to the
populations from which our participants were drawn. Moreover,
states, and counties or cities within states, can differ dramatically
in terms of policy and practice, obligating us to refrain from
generalizing our results too broadly and highlighting the importance of studies like this across diverse jurisdictions.

Conclusion
It seems clear at this point that youth are at increased risk to
enter into plea deals with insufficient legal understanding or compromised decision making, and that many youths who factually
understand the legal process may not fully appreciate the implications of outcomes for their own lives (Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli,
2014; Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016; Redlich et al., 2003). The body
of research is robust enough to suggest that potential safeguards
for the procedural and constitutional rights of youth in the plea
context (e.g., assumption of incompetence for youth) should be
seriously considered.
Nevertheless, what we know about youth in the plea context is
limited relative to what we know about youth (and adults) in other
legal contexts. It is fairly certain that the guilty plea will remain the
primary mode of conviction in the United States for the foreseeable future. Guilty plea decisions are complex and almost always
pit certain short-term advantages against uncertain long-term outcomes; how defendants approach these decisions depends on a
number of factors including individual and group-level differences
across a range of traits (e.g., risk tolerance), which, in turn, are
moderated by context (e.g., pretrial detention). Research that can
identify aspects of the process that exacerbate the effects of developmental immaturity may lead to policy recommendations
aimed at protecting the rights of youth who must make plea
decisions.
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